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The public sphere theory and multitude theory are traditionally seen as being apart. The public 
and the multitude seem so distant notions that we never look into them with a comparative 
viewpoint. In some respects, the multitude seem to be the opposite of the public, many times 
inappropriately compared with crowds or mobs. So, the relation between the public and the 
multitude seem to be a bit unexpected. 
In this paper, we theoretically exam these notions putting them in perspective looking for the 
expected (hopeful) relation. The analysis departs from five features – inclusiveness, the 
common, social body, plural singularities and revolutionary subject. In each one we search 
where the public and the multitude meet and where they differ. In this frame of analysis we will 
suggest that, at some angles, the multitude is a kind of pre-public: an immanent power that 
eventually evolves to a potential critical reasoning force. 
 
 






 The occupation of public space. The collective coordination made by singular individuals. Or the 
expansive networks of commitment toward a mutual goal. What does all these actions have in 
common? All the three entail a working compromise with the concepts of crowd, public and 
multitude. They also show how difficult it is today to fully separate the constitutive continuity 
between these major notions of social and political theory. 
Contemporary times, with the prominence of social movements (such as the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement, in USA) and spontaneous manifestations (Je suis Charlie, in France) confirm the 
growing importance of civic crowds, political publics and the potential of the multitude. Yet, we 
live in a time where crowds have been excluded from the central domain of sociological analysis 
(Borch, 2013: 2), publics have entered a steady decline (Lippman, 1925; Habermas, 1962; 
Sennett, 1974) and the multitude is not an idea without serious problems (Marcos, 2009: 28). 
How can one conciliate the seemingly contradiction where we watch, in internet age, the rise of 
smart mobs (Millan, 2013) or virtual crowds (Mazzarella, 2010: 697), and at the same time the 
denigration or depreciation of crowds? Mazzarella points us to a possible explanation why we 
tend to speak of multitudes rather than crowds. “Crowds are the dark matter that pull on the 
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liberal subject from its past, whereas multitudes occupy the emergent horizon of a postliberal 
politics” (Mazzarella 2010: 697).  
Mobs and crowds flourished in the 18th and 19th century psychological and sociological literature 
expressing the paradox of being both a potential to mass democratization and a risk to urban 
order. They were believed to threat power from the outside (Cannetti, 1960) although were 
initially described as dumb and uncivilized: “In crowds it is stupidity and not mother-wit that is 
accumulated” (Le Bon, 1895: 6). Crowds are “like a savage not prepared to admit that anything 
can come between its desire and the realization of its desire” (Le Bon, 1895: 22). 
In the late 19th century a culture consuming public consolidated the advertising-supported mass 
media. Authors like Lippman (1922) regretted the displacement of a reasoned public opinion by 
a public dominated by the sheer power of numbers. Le Bon, once again, help us understand this 
dislodgment when emphasizes the way ““popes, kings and emperors consent to be interviewed 
as a means of submitting their views on a given subject to the judgment of crowds” (Le Bon, 
1895: 96).  
At the same time, crowds seen an amorphous collective menacing the moral order was linked 
to masses, the anonymous and homogeneous aggregate that came with large-scale 
industrialization and urban life. But while crowds and mobs can be characterized as temporary 
assemblies gathering at specific time and places, masses were more of a conceptual term 
(Bratich, 2005: 249). Since it referred a way of metaphorically denote the loosening of the 
individual in huge collectivities it is an abstract category of social thinking. In addition, unlike 
crowds, masses were undifferentiated, passive and thought to be easy manipulated by mass-
media. “The essence of the masses is indifference: all differences are submerged and drowned 
in the masses. All the colors of the population fade to gray. These masses are able to move in 
unison only because they form an indistinct, uniform conglomerate” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 
xiv). 
Even if the multitude denotes a multiplicity or an expanded set of relations (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 103), it must not be confounded with crowds. Hardt and Negri make a clear distintion 
between the multitude and crowds. “Since the different individuals or groups that make up the 
crowd are incoherent and recognize no common shared elements, their collection of differences 
remains inert and can easily appear as one indifferent aggregate. The components of the 
masses, the mob, and the crowd are not singularities-and this is obvious from the fact that their 
differences so easily collapse into the indifference of the whole. Moreover, these social subjects 
are fundamentally passive in the sense that they cannot act by themselves but rather must be 
led. The crowd or the mob or the rabble can have social effects-often horribly destructive 
effects-but cannot act of their own accord. That is why they are so susceptible to external 
manipulation. The multitude, designates an active social subject, which acts on the basis of what 
the singularities share in common” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 100). Since Maquiavelli, the idea of 
multitude has attracted much attention. From a political point of view, it may even be a better 
concept than the Hobbesian “people”, as Virno (2004), following Spinoza, has argued.  
Still, we need to deal with crowds todays. All it takes to realize it is to turn television on. Today’s 
resurgence of revolutionary crowds draws our attention to joint forms of public contestation 
that resembles the idea of multitude as an immanent and collective social subject. Multitudes 
are close to crowds when they give rise to rallying events such as the globalization protests in 
Seattle, Genoa and Gotemburg. Hardt and Negri (2004) themselves give these examples of how 
the multitude had formed and exhibited its resistance.  It is precisely this possibility of the 
multitude to entail collective action and social criticism that suggests a study on the relations 
between crowds, multitudes and publics could be pursued. 
We agree with Mazarella (2010: 715) when he claims that the apparent negativity of crowds is 
actually a sign of their relevance. If we stop using the crowd in contrast to classical crowd 
psychology literature and embarking in a more nuanced reading of crowds, we can prevent its 
oversimplification. At the same time, we may restore the notion some of its due complexity and 
take up the challenge to ponder it in connection with the multitude. We also align with Borch 
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(2013: 294) and agree that crowds had not become obsolete or that they should be discarded 
from sociological attention. Contrariwise, contemporary diagnoses benefit from establishing 
links between the crowd, the multitude and the public. It was also Le Bon who draw attention 
to the fact of crowds being more than the sum of its members. Crowds were described as a kind 
of organism; they have an identity. By looking into today’s multitude’s repertoires of action we 
see how hard it is to separate it from crowds. And when attesting those repertoires of action we 
also see how the idea of public must now not be far if we intend to comprehend it. 
How can we, in contemporary societies, articulate both? Are there multitudes without publics? 
After the theory of the Public Sphere (Habermas, 1962), or Dayan’s perspective on Almost-
Publics (Dayan, 2001), for example, are Publics still relevant, or were they subsumed by 
multitudes? 
This paper will ponder on the possible relations of the public and the multitude from a 
theoretical point of view. It will not posit a normative theory but it will try to sketch the benefits 
of looking on society from this comparative perspective. Ultimately, it will bring to light the 
affinities we encounter in them when we displace or put in perspective these social categories. 
It will argue there are some dimension from which a prolific dialogue can be established about 
the roles the multitude and the public may play today. We hope in the end that features like 
inclusiveness, the common, the existence of a social body, plural singularities and revolutionary 
subject, make clear how far these notion are today related. 
 
Coincidences and Contrasts on the Public and the Multitude Conceptualizations 
 
We will differentiate five dimensions present in both the public and the multitude, trying to 
define the borders where the notion meet and where they diverge. Is some cases, as we will see, 
the contrast is due, not to a radical nature of the conceptualization but due to different 




In classical Greek political thought the multitude is known as hoi polloi, the many or majority, or 
even the common people on a derogatory sense. In History of the Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides uses the term when referring to Pericles' Funeral Oration speech. But when Greeks 
wanted to mention the multitude they also used plethos. Similar to Greeks, ancient Romans 
used the term plebeius to denote plebs or laypeople. In English the word multitude derives from 
the latin multitudo, meaning a throng, horde or a mass congregation of ordinary people.  
How Habermas defines the public in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere about 
the Bourgeois Public Sphere may be very revealing: “The bourgeois public sphere may be 
conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public” (Habermas, 1962: 
27). Let’s emphasize this coming together. It seems there is a kind of informal unity in the public, 
even if it is composed by an elusive host of individuals coming from different parts and not 
necessarily having any relation between them except a common interest in some occurrence, 
event or problem. “The public, indeed (…) is a crowd dispersed, where the influence of spirits on 
each other became an action remotely, and increasingly at large distances” (Tarde, 1901: 7). 
So, the first comparison we want to make concerns the physical dispersion of the Public and the 
multitude. Like the Public (and unlike the crowd), the multitude entails a physical dispersion, a 
scattered diffusion of its members, a distributed network of different individuals joining 
together. By another hand, like the public, it reaches its most prominence because it assembles 
a mass of detached individuals around an issue. Its force begins in the sheer amount of people 
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it can put together and aligned. Both concepts point to an indefinite extension, a vast and 
unlimited collectivity1. 
Thomas Hobbes, although giving the multitude an a-political character, designates the multitude 
as a significant social aggregate. “Because multitude is a collective word, it is understood to 
signify more than one object, so that a multitude of men is the same as many men. Because the 
word is grammatically singular, it also signifies on thing, namely a multitude” (Hobbes, 1642: 
76). In a multitude there are always too many individuals to order it or find stable, hierarchical 
structures. This is a good thing since it encompasses, not an exclusive but an inclusive concept. 
Anyone can take part in the multitude. In Hobbes, this inclusive character is made the pivotal 
center to separate the multitude, a dispersed non-spatial gathering, and State (and People). This 
is not the occasion to deepen the political philosophy of Hobbes. Suffice is to say, that in Hobbes 
we have already an encompassing conception of the Multitude. It is this capacity to include 
anyone independently of their differences or distance that make it near from the idea of Public. 
This is also relevant form the public point of view. The normative theory of the public sphere 
puts this openness and inclusiveness at the forefront making it a condition to the operative 




Let’s recall once again what Habermas tells us in The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere: "We call events and occasions «public» when they are open to all, in contrast to closed 
or exclusive affairs"(Habermas, 1962: 6). This is the sense of expressions such as public 
education, public health and public opinion. More importantly, he stresses the link between 
what is common and what is public. “The commons was public, publica; for common use there 
was public access to the fountain and market square-loci communes, loci publici” (Habermas, 
1962: 6). So there is a connection between publicity and the common, open, collective access to 
something. To Arendt, the public sphere is exactly this “common world that gather us together 
and prevents our falling over each other” (Arendt, 1958: 52). 
One of the key instances of the (bourgeois) public sphere was “a kind of social intercourse that, 
far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether. The tendency 
replaced the celebration of rank with a tact befitting equals (…) the parity of "common 
humanity" ("bloss Menschliche"). Les hommes, private gentlemen, or die Privatleute made up 
the public not just in the sense that power and prestige of public office were held in suspense; 
economic dependencies also in principle had no influence. Laws of the market were suspended 
as were laws of the state. Not that this idea of the public was actually realized in earnest in the 
coffee houses, the salons, and the societies; but as an idea it had become institutionalized and 
thereby stated as an objective claim ” (Habermas, 1962: 36). Discussion within such a public 
presupposed the problematization of areas that until then had not been probed. The struggle 
against a monopoly of interpretation putted individuals in the same common ground, a 
community of critical enquiry. 
                                                          
1 In Christian tradition, multitude usually describes a mass of people disrupting of political order and 
justice (Jakonen, 2011: 5). Machiavelli’s Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, are a good 
example of this disorderly and destructive dimension of the multitude. “The multitude, following the 
lead of these powerful men, took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid of, obeyed these 
others as their liberators; who, on their part, holding in hatred the name of sole ruler, formed 
themselves into a government and at first, while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh, 
observed the laws they themselves made, and postponing personal advantage to the common welfare, 
administered affairs both publicly and privately with the utmost diligence and zeal”. More, the 
multitude has not a political character: “For though the multitude be unfit to set a State in order, since 
they cannot, by reason of the divisions which prevail among them, agree wherein the true well-being of 
the State lies, yet when they have once been taught the truth, they never will consent to abandon it” 
(Maquiavelli, 1517).  
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When discussing the multitude Hardt and Negri talk on “the production of the common” (2004: 
196). “What it produces, in fact, is common, and that common we share serves as the basis for 
future production, in a spiral, expansive relationship. This is perhaps most easily understood in 
terms of the example of communication as production: we can communicate only on the basis 
of languages, symbols, ideas, and relationships we share in common, and in turn the results of 
our communication are new common languages, symbols, ideas, and relationships. Today this 
dual relationship between production and the common-the common is produced and it is also 
productive-is key to understanding all social and economic activity” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 
197). What they seem to be saying is that social life depend on the common partaking of life.  
If we take the public as a category of the common, we also need to consider publicity in the 
formation of the multitude. The multitude produces the common aspect of life but it is the public 
that manufactures a common life. The means to establish the social are influenced by the quality 
of public life and its ability to raise the common. The multitude, as described by Hardt and Negri, 
seem to build upon this pre-existing commonality. This is why the authors felt the urgency to 
refer to communication while stressing the production of the common in the multitude. Against 
the “expropriation of the common” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 188) they identified in capitalism 
and private property, they appeal to the open, accessible and mutual grounds present in 
communication, be it as symbolic interaction, be it as digital technologies based on the 
immaterial and intellectual property. This common is what the Italian philosopher Paolo Virno, 
following Marx, calls the “general intellect” (Virno, 2004: 64). 
The main objective to Hardt and Negri when bringing the multitude to discussion seems to lie in 
the weight they subtly put on communication to put the common in practice. “In the multitude, 
social differences remain different. The multitude is many-colored, like Joseph's magical coat. 
Thus the challenge posed by the concept of multitude is for a social multiplicity to manage to 
communicate and act in common while remaining internally different” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 
xiv). If the multitude should reveal, not an identity (People) nor a uniformity (masses), those 
internal differences should discover the common that will enable her to communicate and act 
together. 
Just like the public is based on a steady and consistent communicational work (Habermas, 1962), 
the multitude argued by Hardt and Negri seems to discreetly dependent on communication to 
work the common. “Our communication, collaboration, and cooperation are not only based on 
the common, but they in turn produce the common in an expanding spiral relationship” (Hardt 
and Negri, 2004: xv). Since it represents a decentralized network, the Internet is believed to be 
a first draft model to the multitude for two main reasons: “first, the various nodes remain 
different but are all connected in the Web, and, second, the external boundaries of the network 
are open such that new nodes and new relationships can always be added” (Hardt and Negri, 
2004: xv). 
At this point, we need to resist the temptation to equal the public and the multitude. In fact, a 
Res publica is not the same as a Res communis. “The common marks a new form of sovereignty, 
a democratic sovereignty (or, more precisely, a form of social organization that displaces 
sovereignty) in which the social singularities control through their own biopolitical activity those 
goods and services that allow for the reproduction of the multitude itself” (Hardt and Negri, 
2004: 206).  
But this common of the multitude does not have for consequence a constituted, institutional 
substance (like public opinion in the public) or a Gemeinshaft but mostly this common signifies 
a productive activity of singularities. Even though the public and the multitude deal with the 
common, they deal with it differently: in one case as a platform to collective discussion and 
critical subjectivity; in the other case, as an emergent substance of cooperation to a new kind of 
subjectivity.  
 




This new type of subjectivity, as claimed by Hardt and Negri (2004), can be better approached 
through the political philosophy of Spinoza. For Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, there is no mediation 
of a contract required to socialize individuals, nor there is a total transfer of natural rights 
(Armstrong, 2009: 279). In fact, there is a strict coincidence of right and power. That I have the 
right to act means that I have the desire to act and that I have no internal or external 
impediments to do so. Spinoza then concludes that natural right is primary power (potentia), 
therefore, inalienable to a political power (potestas). “When Spinoza speaks of a transfer of 
right, then, this cannot be understood in a juridical sense for it does not imply that transcendent 
transfer which results in an irreversible obligation on the part of the transferee. It is, rather, a 
process by means of which a new (and only relatively irreversible or stable) relation of forces is 
established” (Armstrong, 2009: 283). 
The idea of contract appears in the Political Treatise to refer to the transfer of the multitude’s 
right to one council or one man (Spinoza, 1677: 698). But if there is a right of the multitude it 
transfers, there must be a power of the multitude. The multitude is now regarded as social body 
or a unified collective entity. It is not a mere aggregation of individual powers (we would say a 
mob). “Natural right is now, for the first time, thought explicitly as the power of the mass 
(potentia multitudinis), hence as the ‘right of number’ (since jus=potentia), not, of course, in the 
sense of an arithmetic sum but in the sense of a combination, or rather, an interaction of forces” 
(Balibar, 1985: 15). So, to Spinoza, politics is not reduced to individual and the State. Rather, he 
considers those notions simple abstractions that are adequately apprehended when related to 
the multitude (Armstrong, 2009: 284). The civil state derives its power (potestas) from the 
multitude itself. Spinoza writes about political domination that is imposed by the multitude itself 
and not that one imposed from outside (Desmarest, 2011: 69). 
The multitude gains in Spinoza a social form and political existence that is a power (potentia) in 
itself and the keystone of civil liberties. The multitude indicates, therefore, a plurality or a form 
of being many. In other words, the tradition associated with Spinoza, sees in the multitude the 
mode of being of the many (Virno, 2004: 22). 
It is here we can trace some similarities with the idea of the public. As the multitude, the public 
is composed by a substrata of plural individuals. The public plural not just in its constitution but 
in its many forms (literary publics, political publics, aesthetic publics, television publics, etc). And 
like the multitude the public is believed to be a fundamental social body. More, it is a social and 
political body capable of articulating dissent and critically engage with the state. In this sense, 
the public is also a motor force of social transformation; it is a power. It is the amount of private 
individuals gathered in public together aiming to produce a Public Opinion. The public, like the 
multitude, is something more than the sum of its parts. It is a permanent and interstitial form of 
a free society. A power in itself. 
The most significant aspect relating the public with the multitude is the latter’s need of publicity. 
According to Virno the multitudes indicates “a plurality which persists as such in the public 
scene, in collective action, in the handling of communal affairs without converging into a One” 
(Virno, 2004: 21). Here it is an explicit correlation between the multitude and publicity, the 
multitude and the need to perform publicly (ex: Je suis Charlie is everywhere). 
Just like the category of the public has moved the monopoly of free-thinking from the State to 
individuals, so the multitude is moving the monopoly of political decision-making away from the 
State. In both public and multitude, what is at stake is the will to put into practice a 
performativity and a power  based, not in a synthetic unity but in a composite, mixed and 
crossbreed plurality. It is this plurality, this disseminated and distributed power that we see in 
both notions of the public and the multitude. They are both forms of collective agency. 
 
Plural Singularities  
 
So, the public and the multitude potentiate collectivities. The kind of collectivity is, nonetheless, 
quite dissimilar. The public, by one hand, is a much more political normative collectivity. It is a 
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kind of a critical subject always discussing and debating in order to produce an enlightened 
Public Opinion. It is a collective driven by the opposition or conflict to the State. It is located in 
a public sphere in-between the sphere of Public authority and the private realm (Habermas, 
1962: 30). Individuals are taken to be mostly readers, spectators and auditoires.  
In the case of the multitude, we have “plural singularities” (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 99) and 
“common singularities” (idem: 159).  “The multitude is composed of a set of singularities-and by 
singularity here we mean a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, a 
difference that remains different. The component parts of the people are indifferent in their 
unity; they become an identity by negating or setting aside their differences. The plural 
singularities of the multitude thus stand in contrast to the undifferentiated unity of the people” 
(Hardt and Negri, 2004: 99). 
Resuming the idea of social body, the multitude could, thus be seen as a creative force of the 
many2. A kind of strength given by its many constituents. It is this notion of the many that 
Aristotle has in mind when he contends superiority of the many in contrast to the few. “The 
principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is one that is 
maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For 
the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may 
very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a 
feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each 
individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together, 
they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a figure 
of their mind and disposition. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and 
poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them they understand 
the whole” (Aristotle, 1999: 66).  
The multitude, because is formed by the many, is considered to make better decisions by pooling 
together the experience and knowledge of its individual members3. It can attain a better 
informed judgment than any single member of the body, however excellent it could be 
(Waldron, 1995: 564).  According to Waldron, Aristotle is “committing himself to the proposition 
that the many acting collectively may be a better judge than the few best not only of matters of 
fact, not only of social utility, but also and most importantly of matters of ethics, value, and the 
nature of the good life-issues which go beyond the mere accumulation of individual experience” 
(Waldron, 1995: 569). There is an academic plea whether Aristotle is saying the rule of the 
multitude rested in its superior knowledge (the doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude) 
(Waldron, 1995), or in the belief that the virtue (moral and intellectual capabilities) of multitudes 
can be aggregated (Cammack, 2013). This epistemic and ethic discussion about the extent of 
Aristotle’s words will not be taken here.  
We want rather emphasize the holistic rule of the multitude in knowledge and in virtue. In other 
words, the kind of collectivity the multitude potentiate is based on the amplification of individual 
acts. This notion of amplification is of most significance. Individuals are not aggregated in a 
multitude (or else they would form a mass or a crowd), but each one of their proficiencies are 
assimilated and enlarged. For example, Aristotle tells us: “For all when assembled together have 
sufficient discernment, and by mingling with the better class are of benefit to the state, just as 
impure food mixed with what is pure makes the whole more nourishing than the small amount 
                                                          
2 In a small note in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel discusses the idea of the many: “The expression «The 
Many» (o. polloi) characterizes the empirical universality better than the word “All,” which is in current 
use. Under this “all,” children, women, etc., are manifestly not meant to be included. Manifestly, 
therefore, the definite term “all” should not be employed, when, it may be, some quite indefinite thing 
is being discussed (Hegel, 1821) 
3 This perspective is the same present on Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds (2004) although he refers 
to crowds. The main idea is that the aggregation of expertise forms a collective intelligence that could 
not be attained by individual capabilities alone. 
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of pure food alone; but separately the individual is immature in judgment”. This is of critical 
prominence since it helps us to separate the multitude and the public. The many persevere as 
many without aspiring to the unity (Virno, 2004: 80): its individual singularities do not aspire to 
universality because their generality is already in them. By other hand, the publics usually puts 
its collective action on the hands of individuated persons (private individuals assembling 
together in public). Individualization (not individuation) puts them on track with a universal 
(kantian) principle of criticism and use of reason (cf. Habermas, 1962: 102). 
Let’s now see the implications of this amplification in contrast to the notion of the public. 
Following Cammack’s interpretation on the virtue of the multitude in Aristotle, it is easy to see 
how the multitude is a collectivity of a different kind than the public. According to the theory of 
the public sphere, the public is a rational-critical entity, discussing relevant issues to society. Its 
medium is speech and a privileged locus of debate is the political assembly. When discussing the 
multitude, Aristotle was most likely not thinking on debates in an assembly at all. He cites three 
specific examples of political activity that disregard assembly debates on mass political activity: 
election to important offices, audits, and judging cases in court. The verb bouleuomai suggests 
group discussion and can be equally applied in these cases. (Cammack, 2013: 180). In regard the 
speech, Aristotle could not have braced the political authority of the multitude on the basis of 
speech (logos) since his comments would also apply to animals which do not have an articulate 
reason. “The possession of logos, “articulate reason” or “speech,” was to Aristotle the crucial 
difference between humans and divine beings on the one hand, and all other living creatures on 
the other. Under no circumstances could he have supposed that his argument would also apply 
to animals if speech played any part in it. It follows that speech cannot be a key feature of the 
political situations that he has in mind” (Cammack, 2013: 181). 
So, two attributes of the public are not present in the multitude if we are to agree with Aristotle’s 
perspective. Political assemblies and speech are not determinant in the multitude. He is more 
interested in the politeia, not in demokratia. This, once again, brings us crucial insights.  
The multitude may be apprehended a collectivity based in plural singularities that should not be 
thought as dependent on logos or speech like the public. Instead, they involve a common 
emotion (like today’s common fear of terrorism, or a common hope in peace in Israel). Passions 
have since Spinoza a directly socializing function and are cited by him as the principal cause of 
the constitution of the multitude. “Since men, as we have said, are led more by passion than by 
reason, it naturally follows that a people will unite and consent to be guided as if by one as . . . 
a common hope, or common fear, or desire to avenge some common injury (Spinoza,1677: 700). 
The point to note is that the type of sociability moving the multitude has its source on feelings. 
What binds them, after Spinoza, is the universal existence a common passion playing a unifying 
role in the network of individuals defining the multitude (ex: Manifestations of dissent and 
homage after the Charlie Hebdo killings in January 2015).  
So, the multitude, more than a collective reasoning, encompasses a generalized feeling, a 
sharable sentiment. The multitude perpetrates a contagion. But unlike the primary contagion of 
the crowd (Tarde would call it the imitation), the multitude suggests a reciprocal influence or 
sympaty (syn-pathos). It is not a duplication rather than a unified affect. One could also say the 
multitude encompasses mirroring. So, it is not a surprise that the multitude sometimes evolve 
to crowds.The passional multitude can act and perform in many other ways (just like the Seattle 
anti-globalization protests demonstrate) including effervescence, aesthetic actions, and the 
occupation of the public space.  
The multitude is close to the bare flesh, to ordinary individuals, to their own afflictions. It is a 
collectivity nourished by the social, by the encompassing notion of politeia, a community of 
citizens interest not just in politics but in their own civic community. The verb "politeuomai" 
means an active citizen of the city state. We will see we can refer to the multitude as a 
revolutionary subject. 
 




What is the most distinguishing feature between the public and the multitude? Where is the 
contrast between these old categories? A start of an answer would be in the downfall of the 
individual. Where the public is based on a strict subjectivity, the multitude is accused by the 
postliberal point of view of depreciate individuality. This points to different valorizations of the 
collective agency. Stating the plural singularities of the multitude means, especially after Hardt 
and Negri (2000; 2004), it always comes first, it is an ontological foundation of society. It is 
fundamentally differentiated but nonetheless a collective subject and an explosion of multiply 
as a subject. Thus, for the authors of Empire and Multitude, democracy should be invented by 
the multitude. Its immanence signifies a political self-management and autonomy. Political and 
social innovation comes through the networks that digital technologies attest. 
Both multitude and public entail a vital force or groundbreaking subject. Even so, in Hardt and 
Negri’s vision, the multitude is much more, in Borch’s words (2013: 288), a “revolutionary 
subject”. The multitude is the answer according to Hardt and Negri to resist the predominant 
order. Empire is believed to be a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: xii) based on a capitalist that is the product of the collapse of the Soviet 
communism. The multitude is the immanent strategy that acts as a counter-power within and 
against Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 61), a postmodern resistance using the logics of the 
Empire (its decentralized network) to turn down its functioning. So, in a postmodern world, the 
conditions of doing resistance change. While crowd protests, social movements and general 
strikes should have been effective, today it is a new agent, the multitude, that take place the 
crowd (Borch, 2013: 291).  
Despite Hardt and Negri do say it, we would add that, after the discussion taken by Empire and 
Multitude, it is the multitude that is prone to displace the public as the most apt collective agent 
to adapt to postmodern societies. The multitude is, then, the revolutionary subject who turns 
explicit the obsolescence of traditional political institutions. It is as if the multitude is for the 
postmodern politics what the public was to modern societies. Hardt and Negri (2004) are thus 
claiming a new political lexicon, while Virno (2004) argues the specific grammar of the multitude. 
Just like a new democratic understanding has arisen since the rise of the public, the multitude is 
actively claiming a new modus operandi of politics. And just like the public is an eminent 
communicational concept, the multitude demands communication in order to be apprehended. 
The most vibrant example of this lies in the role networked communications (internet, social 
networks, Web 2.0) play today on the visible materialization of the multitude through crowds, 
protests and political humor and irony. 
If an emancipatory role can be attributed to the public, the multitude is described to take that 
concept to another level, that of comprehensiveness: immanent emancipation. A politics to 
everyone. Or better, a society by everyone, the many, the anonymous multitude. Hardt and 
Negri see in the multitude the spinozian potential, an indwelling capacity to act (Ruddick, 2010: 
25), a constitutive power that has become a political agent. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed the interplay between two central ideas of contemporary social 
theory: the public and the multitude. We have taken a path that exams these collective agents 
in close proximity departing from its similarities (inclusiveness, the common) through some 
different approaches to collective agency (social body, plural singularities) until reach again a 
kind of similarity (emancipation). 
We have claimed that the public and the multitude, as it has been theorized, put high the idea 
of common. But in the first case the common signifies mainly a symbolic departure to a critical 
subjectivity. With the multitude, this subjectivity is more radical and even more committed to 
emancipation and revolution. Hardt and Negri (2000) define the multitude as the ultimate form 
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of resistance to power. They see in the constitutive power (potential) of the multitude as a 
counter power. Just like the multitude, the public operates many times as counter-power. The 
public, like the multitude, is a form of collective agency that battles installed powers.  
The public and the multitude make publicity its premise and reveal a communicational 
foundation of publicity. Demands  need to be shared, emotionalized, enacted, performed and 
sanctioned publicly. Media play a crucial role on this exemplifying the symbolical and 
technologically network of individuals. 
The aspect that most clearly separates the public and the multitude is the dialogue that establish 
with the category of universality. While singularities are individualized in the own constitution 
of the public (the public sphere is defined as private people gathered in public), in the multitude 
plural singularities, after Hardt and Negri (2004) do not aspire to universality. The general 
common is the basic premise of their association, not an elective affinity, a particular interest or 
the coincidence of reading the same newspaper (public). 
If we would want to synthesize, one could say that the public is undoubtedly a modern 
conception and the Hardt and Negri’s multitude is a postmodern approach to collective subjects. 
This does not mean the public is not fundamental to contemporary times. Not at all. It is 
precisely because the public and the multitude are central notions in today’s societies that a 
comparative analysis is required. Today’s protests, social movements, media audiences or 
crowds display a panoply of forms that put in question the traditional idea of the public. The 
concept of multitude has gained traction and many authors from both communication studies 
and political science are paying attention to it. We may interpret this tendency as the 
confirmation of the intermingling of both concepts in today’s many forms of public intervention. 
A central assertion of this paper is that we need to consider the public and the multitude as 
possibly being interdependent. At some angles, the multitude seems to be type of pre-public: an 
immanent power that can evolve to be a potential critical reasoning force. Like the multitude, 
the public is sometimes associated with a disseminated and distributed authority. The multitude 
could eventually be considered a pre-public because, as we have seen, there many coincidental 
aspects. We discard the whole idea of a proto-public since the constitutive power (potencia, not 
potestas) of the multitude does not consubstantiate in the formation of a critical and rational 
subject. The multitude is not an incomplete form of the public. From multitudes, publics could 
eventually stem. In this sense, the multitude may lead to the formation of the public meaning 
that is those specific cases the multitude acts like zero-degree of the public, a pre-public. 
However, compared to the public, the multitude lacks the logocratic dimension the public has. 
It lacks speech, deliberation or opinion. It lacks reason and linguistic discourse. But, on other 
hand, maybe what Hardt and Negri (2004) see as a power (potentia) on the idea of multitude is 
that very absence. Maybe because the multitude is less than a public that it is something more 
than it. The advantage of dealing with the multitude is to conceive a collective agency so 
dispersed and heterogenic that resistance is more effective.  This seems to be what the theory 
of the public has difficulty to accept.  
The analysis of the complexity of postmodern societies must lie on interdisciplinary readings and 
hybrid approaches. As such concept as almost-public exemplifies, traditional theory of the public 
may not be sufficient. Maybe the idea of public will benefit if related to the multitude. We have 
referred to this connection as an (un)expected relation. We have been inspired in the latin 
etymology of expectare: to look thoroughly. The relation between the public and the multitude 
could not be anticipated, could not be forecasted twenty years ago. So it may be unexpected. 
Yet, social analysis must now presume the linking between them. Especially when the public, 
the multitude and crowds depend on networked media to make them visible. In this case, the 
relation among the public and the multitude is not just awaited. It is, above all, a relation we 
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